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Abstract: Recent research on exchange rate regime choice in developing countries has 
revealed that a range of factors, from weak fiscal institutions to the inability to borrow 
in their own currencies, limits the range of options available to them. This paper uses 
the case of Liberia to illustrate that new states in Africa during the gold standard era 
faced similar limitations, even in the absence of formal colonial rule. The rapid depre-
ciation of the Liberian dollar in the nineteenth century led to the adoption of sterling 
as a medium of exchange and store of value. This initially made it easier for Liberia to 
service its sterling-denominated debt and for Liberians to purchase imports from Brit-
ain. However, as economic relations with the United States deepened during the twen-
tieth century, instability in the pound-dollar exchange rate created serious dislocations 
in the Liberian economy, ultimately leading the official adoption of the U.S. dollar in 
1943.  The story of Liberia illustrates the long-standing challenges of globalization for 
peripheral economies and suggests the need for a reassessment of the origins and im-
pact of colonial monetary regimes.  
                                               
1 This research began as part of the British Museum’s Money in Africa project, Leverhulme Trust grant 
‘Money in Africa’, number F/00 052/D. I am grateful to Olivier Accominotti, Catherine Schenk, 
Gareth Austin three anonymous referees and participants in the African Economic History Workshop 
and the ‘Money and Borders’ panel at the CAS@50 conference. I would also like to thank the Seeley 
G. Mudd Manuscript Library at Princeton University for providing me with a copy of Kemmerer’s re-
port on Liberia.  
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In his history of the British colonial currency system in West Africa, Hopkins writes 
that ‘the interests of western nations lay in ensuring that the currencies of countries 
engaged in international trade were soundly based, readily convertible, and otherwise 
compatible with the working of the gold standard, so that world commerce could be 
conducted and expanded with smooth efficiency’.2 Colonial currency regimes, which 
required colonies to adopt metropolitan currencies (or colonial currencies issued at 
fixed rates of exchange with metropolitan currencies), were heavily criticized at inde-
pendence for promoting metropolitan interests at the expense of development in the 
colonies.3 Critics argued that colonial currency boards created a deflationary bias in 
growing colonial economies by linking volume of local currency to the trade balance 
rather than domestic demands.4 In addition, they claimed that the high reserve re-
quirements of currency boards restricted funds available for development.5 Finally, 
the fact that currency boards could not engage in independent monetary, credit or 
banking policy was believed by critics to be, as Schwartz describes it, ‘a fatal institu-
tional shortcoming’.6 Such criticisms provided the primary justification for the aban-
donment of the currency board system by most former British colonies, which re-
placed them with national central banks after the transfer of power.  However, the 
functions of the new central banks were often restricted by a general dependence on 
primary exports and foreign capital to such a degree that Schenk describes them as 
‘currency boards in all but name’.7  
                                               
2 Hopkins, ‘Creation of a colonial monetary system’, p. 101.  See also Herbst, States and Power, pp. 
211-13; Helleiner, ‘Monetary dimensions of colonialism, and; Uche, ‘From Currency Board to Central 
Banking’, p. 147.  
3 Schenk, ‘Monetary institutions’, p. 181. More detail on colonial currency regimes can be found in 
Abdel-Salam, ‘Evolution of African Monetary Systems’; Clauson, ‘British colonial currency system’; 
Helleiner, ‘Monetary dimensions of colonialism’. 
4 Treadgold, ‘The Philippine currency board arrangement’, pp. 57-8. Treadgold finds that such a bias 
did not exist in the Philippine case.  
5 Hazelwood, ‘Economics of colonial monetary arrangements’, pp. 312-4.  
6 Schwartz, ‘Currency boards’, p. 171.  
7 Schenk, ‘Monetary institutions’.  
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In the debate about colonial monetary systems, the experiences of the two Af-
rican countries that remained politically independent – Liberia and Ethiopia – has 
been neglected.  When added to the larger story of African monetary history, howev-
er, the history of these two countries illustrates that African governments were faced 
with the same constraints as the governments of other peripheral countries in the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, even in the absence of formal colonial rule. It 
was these constraints which limited the scope for independent monetary policy. Bordo 
and Flandreau have argued that countries on the periphery during the gold standard 
era faced many of the same dilemmas as they do today.8 Research on the choice of 
exchange rate regimes by the governments of developing countries in the twenty-first 
century has stressed that they often have a limited range of options.  Weak fiscal insti-
tutions leave their currencies prone to high inflation and currency crises.9 As a result, 
many countries take steps to limit exchange rate fluctuations, exhibiting a ‘fear of 
floating’.10 Further, countries with underdeveloped domestic financial markets can 
raise domestic debt only at higher costs (described in the literature as ‘original sin’), 
often compelling governments to borrow abroad. This leaves them vulnerable to debt 
crises if local currencies depreciate relative to the currency in which they have bor-
rowed.11 One potential solution is to peg to anchor currencies, but such pegs can lack 
credibility, leaving the remaining option the adoption of a ‘super hard peg’ such as a 
currency board or full dollarization.12 However, this requires some loss of monetary 
independence. The adoption of a foreign currency, in particular, also has political 
                                               
8 Bordo and Flandreau, ‘Core, Periphery, Exchange Rate Regimes and Globalization’, p. 4.  
9 Calvo and Mishkin, ‘Mirage of exchange rate regimes’, p. 104.  
10 Calvo and Rheinhart, ‘Fear of floating’.  
11 Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza, ‘Currency mismatches’, pp. 122-3; Flandreau and Sussman, 
‘Old Sins’.  
12 Selgin and White, ‘Credible currency’. The example of Argentina illustrates the impact of limited 
credibility. See Calvo, Money, Exchange Rates and Output, ch. 7.  
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costs. Currencies provide a symbol of national sovereignty, and losing this symbol 
can be politically damaging even if it provides economic benefits.13 
 This paper examines how one independent African country, Liberia, coped 
with these choices through the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Its experience 
provides an opportunity to assess the costs and benefits of different exchange rate re-
gimes for African economies in the absence of colonial rule. Founded by the Ameri-
can Colonization Society (ACS) in 1822 for the settlement of freed slaves, Liberia 
declared its independence in 1847. From that year the Liberian Treasury began to is-
sue one of Africa’s first national currencies, the Liberian dollar.  The Liberian dollar 
was initially issued at par with the American dollar, but repeated fiscal crises during 
the nineteenth century compelled the Treasury to supplement the original coins with a 
paper currency which quickly depreciated.  From as early as the 1870s sterling was 
substituted, first by private actors and then the Liberian government, leading to a sys-
tem which would today be called de facto ‘dollarization’.14 Sterling was replaced by 
the U.S. dollar in 1943, as the devaluation of sterling relative to the dollar raised the 
cost of servicing Liberia’s increasingly dollar-denominated debts. This shift reflected, 
on a small scale, the rising dominance of the dollar and the expansion of U.S. interests 
in Africa. By adopting a super-fixed regime, the Liberian government opted for a sys-
tem similar to that used in colonised territories. The adoption of foreign currencies 
(first sterling, then the U.S. dollar) represented a sacrifice of political sovereignty 
which served the interests of Liberian elites who needed access to foreign trade and 
capital in order to maintain control over their territory.   
                                               
13 Alesina and Barro, ‘Dollarization’, p. 381; Lamdany and Dorlhiac, ‘The dollarization of a small 
economy’, p. 93; LeBaron and McCulloch, ‘Floating, fixed, or super-fixed?’, p. 34. With reference to 
Africa in particular: Herbst, States and Power, pp. 201-3.  
14 Duffy et al., ‘Dollarization traps’, pp. 2073-4.  This paper follows the somewhat awkward conven-
tion of using ‘dollarization’ to refer to the adoption of any foreign currency.  In Liberia’s case, this was 
sterling until 1943, followed by the U.S. dollar. Where dollarization refers to sterling, inverted commas 
will be used to distinguish it from reference to the dollar.  
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Liberia has long been neglected in much of the literature on West African 
economic and financial history.15 The dearth of research on Liberia is partly due to the 
fact that records from the nineteenth and early twentieth century are fragmentary. In 
what remains one of the leading texts on Liberian economic history, Brown observes 
that ‘as official sources and accredited public documents on Liberian history are far 
from numerous, the research problems of selectivity give way almost wholly to the 
more difficult task of critically assessing such documents as do exist’.16 This problem 
has been compounded since Brown completed his research in the late 1930s by the 
destruction of large portions of Liberia’s national archives during the civil war of the 
1990s.17 As a result, any picture of Liberia’s economic and financial development be-
fore World War II has to be pieced together from a variety of sources.18  
This paper draws primarily on the diplomatic correspondence of the British 
and American governments, which often includes reproductions of original Liberian 
government documents and newspaper clippings. Published primary sources from Li-
beria, such as the inaugural addresses of Liberian presidents and their statements to 
the Liberian legislature, allow a partial glimpse into the domestic politics of the peri-
od.19 Added to these sources are surviving records from the Bank of British West Af-
rica, which operated in Liberia from 1905-31 and served as the state bank for much of 
this period. Quantitative data on trade, government revenue and expenditure, and ex-
change rates – unfortunately with large gaps, particularly for the nineteenth century - 
are drawn primarily from the Statesman’s Yearbook, supplemented by figures quoted 
in qualitative records which allow for consistency checks. Evidence from a variety of 
                                               
15 Hopkins notes that the regional focus of his classic Economic History of West Africa allows him to 
incorporate Liberia, but he country’s history is not addressed in any great detail.  
16 Brown, Economic History of Liberia, p. 323.  
17 Osborne, ‘A Note on the Liberian Archives’.  
18 The need to draw on a variety of sources in researching African history is stressed in Ellis, ‘Writing 
histories of contemporary Africa’, pp. 12-15.  
19 Guannu, Inaugural Addresses; Huberich, Political and Legislative History.  
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reports commissioned by the Liberian government, companies with economic inter-
ests in Liberia, and international bodies such as the League of Nations also inform this 
paper. Finally, the Bank of England archive holds records on Liberia from the 1930s 
onwards, which are also used here.  
  Subsequent sections of the paper each focus on a specific exchange rate re-
gime adopted by the Liberian government. The next section (I) focuses on Liberia’s 
early economic and political history, and the issue and then depreciation of the Liberi-
an dollar. Section II examines Liberia’s adoption of sterling in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, drawing on the insights of modern research on dollarization. 
The following section (III) assesses the costs and benefits of the substitution of ster-
ling in Liberia in the inter-war period.  In Section IV the transition from sterling to the 
U.S. dollar provides an empirical illustration of the challenges of changing currencies 
once de facto dollarization has occurred. Section V concludes by using the case of 
Liberia in comparison with colonized African countries to suggest avenues for re-
search in assessing the impacts of colonialism for financial development in Africa.  
 
I 
 
When Liberia declared its independence in 1847, it quickly received diplomat-
ic recognition from a number of European states, signing its first treaty with the Unit-
ed Kingdom in 1848.20 The new country’s biggest challenge was economic and fiscal 
survival. In his inaugural address, Liberia’s first president, Joseph Roberts, stated that 
‘fears are entertained, by some persons abroad, that the citizens of Liberia, when 
thrown upon their own resources, will probably not sustain the government, and that 
                                               
20 U.S. Senate, Affairs in Liberia, p. 6.  
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anarchy and its attendant ruins will be the result of their independence’.21 Proving 
these fears wrong was a key aim of Liberia’s early economic policies.  
Roberts had become Liberia’s first non-white administrator in 1841, two years 
after the American Colonization society had granted powers of self-government to the 
Commonwealth of Liberia, a union of settler outposts along the coast.22 Settlers in-
cluded immigrants from the United States and Barbados, along with a small number 
of recaptives, or Africans freed from slave ships by the U.S. Navy. This small coastal 
elite, and their descendants (often referred to as Americo-Liberians), dominated Libe-
ria’s economic and political institutions until a coup in 1980 removed them from 
power.23 American sociologist Charles Spurgeon Johnson, writing after visiting Libe-
ria as part of a League of Nations delegation in the 1930s, described the position as 
follows: ‘There is something fantastic about the spectacle of 12,000 to 15,000 Ameri-
can Liberians, concentrated in six small towns on the coast, presuming to control an 
area of 43,000 square miles and an unknown native population of about 1.5 million.’24  
The tenuous position of the Americo-Liberians relative to both the much larger indig-
enous population as well as the increasingly powerful imperial interests along Libe-
ria’s borders shaped the Republic’s early policies. It provided both the initial incen-
tive for issuing a national currency, as well as the foundations for its failure.  
The issue of the Liberian dollar from 1847 formed a key ingredient in the na-
tionalist project of the Americo-Liberians. Emblazoned with the country’s new name, 
the ‘Republic of Liberia’, along with images of an oil palm and sailing ships – two 
key mainstays of Liberia’s economy in the mid-nineteenth century – the new Liberian 
                                               
21 Guannu, Inaugural Addresses, pp. 1-9.  
22 Buell, Liberia, pp. 20-1; Fyfe, ‘Freed slave colonies’, p. 194.  
23 Boley, Liberia. Limited extensions of political voice to indigenous groups were made from the 
1870s. See Gershoni, Black Colonialism, pp. 25-6; Akpan, ‘Black colonialism’.   
24 Johnson, Bitter Canaan, p. 85.  
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coins were a demonstration of political sovereignty.25 The Liberian dollar joined a 
wide variety of currencies used as a means of exchange in West African trade during 
the nineteenth century26 The creation of these coins suggested that the authority they 
intended to demonstrate was largely illusory – they were minted in England with fi-
nancial assistance from British philanthropists.27   
Issuing a national currency was part of a series of efforts by the Liberian gov-
ernment to assert its sovereignty and extend its control over the expanding commerce 
of the region. The ACS had encouraged the development of a coastal trade for reve-
nue purposes, and many settlers found they had a greater comparative advantage as 
traders along the coast than as cultivators in the interior.28  President Roberts is one 
example. Before migrating from Virginia to Liberia in 1829, he had operated several 
trading vessels on the James and Appomattox rivers and brought with him both capi-
tal and experience, which he used to establish a prosperous trading business in Mon-
rovia. 29  Other Americo-Liberians also amassed considerable individual fortunes 
through trading and ship-building, which reached a high point in the first decades af-
ter 1847 before declining as a result of falling export prices and European competi-
tion.30 
Americo-Liberians were aware that they needed to increase production of raw 
materials from the interior if trade were to expand. From 1858, the Liberian legisla-
ture authorized funds for prize money to be given at the National Fair held in Monro-
via. Prizes were awarded for innovations in agricultural production and manufactur-
                                               
25 Examples of Liberian coins are held by the British Museum.  
26 Fry, Bankers in West Africa, pp. 4-5; Hopkins, Economic History of West Africa, pp. 67-8. 
27 Johnston, Liberia, p. 234.  
28 Syfert, ‘Liberian Coasting Trade’. See also Fyfe, ‘Freed slave colonies’, p. 193 
29 Henries, Life of Joseph Jenkins Roberts, pp. 8-10; Syfert, ‘Liberian Coasting Trade’, p. 223.  
30 Syfert, ‘Liberian coasting trade’, pp. 228-30.  
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ing.31 Early commercial policies sought to shield the Liberian economy from foreign 
influences. The constitution limited landownership to citizens of Liberia, and later 
legislation restricted foreign traders to a limited number of ports of entry.32 The Brit-
ish government, in particular, complained that such policies were responsible for hin-
dering trade and development in Liberia.33 These early protectionist policies contrast 
sharply with the open, concession-oriented economic policy adopted by the Liberian 
government from the inter-war period.34 In making this transition, Liberia bears a 
strong resemblance to post-independence Peru a few decades earlier.35   
One of the National Fair prizes was awarded to James Payne, a Methodist 
minister and future president of Liberia (1868-70 and 1876-8), who had submitted an 
essay on the ‘Principles of Political Economy, as adapted to the Republic of Libe-
ria’.36  Payne noted the link between fiscal expansion and territorial expansion, writ-
ing that ‘the extension of the jurisdictihn [sic] of the government and the fair acquisi-
tion of territory are much dependent upon the state of economy within’. 37 As the 
nineteenth century progressed, the Liberian government found itself increasingly de-
fending its claims to the interior from both indigenous groups as well as expanding 
European colonies.38 A series of uprisings by indigenous groups continued through 
the early twentieth century, requiring costly military responses.39 This was not unique 
to Liberia, as the costs of conquest represented a large share of early colonial budg-
                                               
31 Brown, Economic History of Liberia, p. 26.  
32 Ibid, p. 141.  
33 Wallis, Report for the Year 1906.  
34 Clower, Growth without development; Miller and Carter, ‘A Modern Dual Economy’.   
35 Gootenberg, Between Silver and Guano.  
36 For more on Payne’s background, see Turner to Fish, 30 May 1875, in FRUS 1875, p. 831.   
37 Payne, ‘A prize essay on political economy’, pp. 14-15. See also Steadman, ‘Report on the fiscal 
system’, p. B-1.  
38 Foley, ‘British policy in Liberia’; Liebenow, Liberia, pp. 22-3; U.S. Senate, Affairs in Liberia, pp. 8-
10.  
39 Fyfe, ‘Freed slave colonies’, p. 195.  
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ets.40 However, as Johnson observed: ‘British and French colonists have found them-
selves similarly disproportionate, but behind them always has been the inflexible arm 
of a determined and secure mother country’.41 The US Navy had helped defend 
Americo-Liberian settlements during the 1820s and 1830s. However, once the U.S. 
government – caught between demands for protection from Americo-Liberians and 
pressure from the British government to clarify its position – abandoned all claims to 
making Liberia a formal colony in 1843, support for intervention in Liberia waned.42 
Fiscal data for Liberia in the 19th century are patchy and different sources give 
conflicting figures. The Statesman’s Yearbook gives the most systematic series, but 
figures are often given as estimates or averages over a period of years, and are fre-
quently inconsistent with other contemporary sources. For example, the Statesman’s 
Yearbook gives the revenue for 1864 as $100,000, while in his inaugural address in 
the same year, President Daniel Warner (1864-8) stated that the annual revenue was 
$45,000. In 1878, a report by the U.S. Legation in Liberia gave a figure of  $119,890 
for Liberia’s revenue for that year while the Statesman’s Yearbook claims revenue of 
$85,000. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that a period of near-constant fiscal 
crisis continued from the 1860s through much of the rest of the century. In his inaugu-
ral address, Warner called for a ‘vigorous retrenchment of Government expenditure’, 
in light of ‘our financial depression’.43 The Treasury’s struggles to meet the demands 
of expansion were compounded by weak fiscal management. In 1864 a commission 
appointed to investigate the public finances reported ‘much irregularity and looseness 
in keeping the public accounts’.44 The late 1870s stand out as a period of particular 
                                               
40 Gardner, Taxing Colonial Africa, ch. 1. 
41 Johnson, Bitter Canaan, p. 85.  
42 Van Sickle, ‘Reluctant Imperialists’.  
43 Guannu, Inaugural Addresses, pp. 42-54.  
44 Quoted in Boley, Liberia, p. 32.  
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fiscal difficulty, linked partly to a Grebo uprising in 1875.45 Both the Statesman’s 
Yearbook and the U.S. legation reported large deficits in the years following the re-
volt.46 
Lacking external support, the Liberian government had few resources with 
which to fund these deficits, and turned to the printing press. In his 1858 essay, Payne 
warned about the need for caution on issuing paper currency:   
If the government puts in circulation a paper medium – negotiable only in the 
country – and promises to redeem it with specie at its treasury department, it 
certainly should know, at any moment, how much of this currency is in circu-
lation, and should keep itself prepared to redeem it.  It should be cautious in 
circulating it, to have at least a strong probability of a sufficiency of specie to 
redeem it.  Otherwise, some citizen, presuming upon the good faith of the 
government, may suffer embarrassment.  He may have disposed of valuable 
property for this medium, expecting to engage in some lucrative enterprise, 
but, to his astonishment, inconvenience an injury, he finds it cannot be re-
deemed!  His faith in the monetary matters of the government wanes at this 
moment.47 
By the early 1860s, the Liberian Treasury began to issue of unbacked paper to pay 
military wages along with other government expenses. Warner’s second inaugural 
address in 1866 referred to ‘an immoderate expansion of paper currency notes, which 
had resulted in a severe monetary distress upon the whole country’ prior to 1864.48 
Ironically, one such issue occurred during Payne’s presidency, just ten years after he 
                                               
45 For a contemporary account of the Grebo uprising, see FRUS 1875, pp. 832-3.  
46 The Statesman’s Yearbook records revenue of $85,000 and expenditure of $124,000, while the U.S. 
legation reported revenue of $119,890 and expenditure of $124,167.  
47 Payne, ‘A prize essay on political economy’, p. 80.  
48 Guannu, Inaugural Addresses, pp. 54-64.  
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wrote his essay.49 Payne’s change of heart suggests that the weakness of Liberia’s fis-
cal institutions left the government with limited options.   
 The paper issued took a variety of different forms.  By the early twentieth cen-
tury it included what were referred to as ‘general government papers’, or bills issued 
directly by the Secretary of the Treasury, used in payment to European merchants 
who accepted them at below par value but used them to pay customs duties at par. 
These were used in payment to European merchants, who would accept them in ex-
change for goods at below par value but return them to the government in payment of 
customs duties at par. They also included currency bills, described in a British trade 
report as ‘lithographed papers, issued in the form of bank notes and drawn upon the 
treasury’. Municipal governments and county superintendents also issued their own 
bills, which could be used to pay customs duties.50 The fact that such bills were wide-
ly used to pay customs duties and as instruments of public spending (and often at dif-
ferent rates) helps explain the difficulty in finding consistent totals for revenue and 
expenditure. Payne, in his inaugural address in 1868, confessed that his government 
could not come to an accurate figure of the amount of Liberian currency and other 
forms of government paper in the hands of the public.51  
By 1871, the state of the currency remained a source of concern to the Liberi-
an government.  At his inauguration, Payne’s successor, Edward Roye, proclaimed 
that ‘we must have a sound par value currency’, and proposed one of a series of 
measures to ‘relieve the depressed position of our currency’. Alongside the depreciat-
ed currency was a growing burden of domestic debt.52 One such measure was a turn to 
the international capital market. In that year the Liberian government raised its first 
                                               
49 U.S. Legation, Monrovia, to Department of State, 30 May 1875, in FRUS 1875 vol II, p. 831.  
50 Wallis, Report for the Year 1906, p. 15; Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, Annual Report 1903-4, 
p. 253. 
51 Guannu, Inaugural Addresses, pp. 65-75. 
52 Ibid, pp. 76-85.  
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loan on the London market. The loan of £100,000 was to be allocated as follows: 
£25,000 was to be deposited in the Treasury as a basis for the issue of paper currency, 
thus curbing the depreciation of the Liberian dollar, a further £25,000 was to be used 
to pay off the floating internal debt, and the remaining £50,000 was to be held as an 
emergency fund.53 The loan was guaranteed with future customs receipts and the rev-
enue from a proposed excise tax. The loan was issued at a discount of 30 per cent, and 
as a result the Liberian government received only £70,000 in cash for the £100,000 in 
debt. Interest at 7 per cent was payable three years in advance, which reduced the 
amount received in cash still further. By 1874, the Liberian government had stopped 
paying interest on the loan. In 1895, the principal and arrears amounted to £254,000.54  
Bordo and Flandreau argue that peripheral countries in the gold standard era 
had to choose between super hard fixed exchange rates and restricting foreign borrow-
ing because devaluation in local currency led to debt crises.55 In Liberia’s case, the 
collection of customs revenue in depreciated government paper made servicing the 
loan difficult. Complicating the situation further was a political crisis surrounding the 
loan. President Roye (1870-71) agreed to the loan over the protests of many of the 
Liberian elite, who found the terms of the loan disadvantageous.  Adding insult to in-
jury, he issued a proclamation in October 1871 extending his term of office from two 
years to four. Roye was deposed and imprisoned shortly afterwards in Liberia’s first 
coup. Reports of what happened afterwards vary, but several contemporary sources 
suggest that Roye escaped from prison in possession of a substantial share of the loan 
proceeds, with which he drowned while trying to flee the country.56   
                                               
53 Johnson, Bitter Canaan, p. 98.  
54 Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, Annual Report 1895, pp. 197-8; Johnston, Liberia, pp. 259-63.   
55 Bordo and Flandreau, ‘Core, Periphery, Exchange Rate Regimes and Globalization’, p. 6.  
56 Johnston, Liberia, pp. 261-3.  
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What proportion of the 1871 loan reached the Liberian Treasury remains un-
known, but it was unlikely to have been more than a third. As a result, the Liberian 
dollar continued to decline in value through the remainder of the century. Data on ex-
change rates are fragmentary. In 1876, the Statesman’s Yearbook reported revenue 
and expenditure in ‘paper currency’ at an exchange of $7 to the pound (while the U.S. 
dollar was worth just over $5 to the pound). In 1880, the government issued a new 
instrument - ten-year domestic bonds at six per cent – in exchange for the paper cur-
rency still in circulation. Three years later, a law was passed providing for the remov-
al from circulation of half of the paper currency paid into the Treasury. It also in-
structed the Treasury to hold a tenth of the gold coin it received in a fund to meet for-
eign payments. In 1884, a further law mandated that domestic creditors should be paid 
two-thirds in gold and one-third in paper – Brown estimates that this approximated to 
a 25 per cent reduction in the nominal value of their claims. These efforts may have 
had some effect – the 1884 the Statesman’s Yearbook estimates an exchange rate of 
$5 in Liberian paper money to the pound sterling. However, they were undermined by 
a further issue of paper money in 1893 to meet the costs of a renewed revolt by the 
Grebo, as a result of which, according to Brown, the value of the paper currency fell 
75 per cent below par.57 
 
II 
 
The declining value of the Liberian dollar left many people in Liberia looking for an 
alternative.  This was true not only of Americo-Liberian elites like Roberts who were 
involved in trade, but also of indigenous Africans employed in the commercial sector. 
                                               
57 Brown, Economic History of Liberia, p. 335.  
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McKinnon notes that in small areas with currencies that are not pegged to currencies 
of larger areas, the liquidity value of the small area’s currency will be limited and 
‘domestic nationals will attempt to accumulate foreign bank balances’.58 Americo-
Liberians involved in trade would have wanted to receive payment for their exports in 
a currency which could consistently be used to purchase imported goods, either for 
trade in the interior or consumption. Further, a large number of indigenous Liberians, 
particularly the Kru, were employed in the shipping trades all along the West African 
coast. Working as sailors, boat-builders, warehousemen, interpreters and etc., they 
would accumulate their wages over a period of several years and then use them to 
purchase European goods with which they would return home, acquire land and mar-
ry.59 
As the Liberian dollar declined in value through the late nineteenth century, 
increasing quantities of British sterling currency were flowing into West Africa due to 
the expansion of trade and the establishment of British colonies in the region.  The 
principal increase was in token silver coins, which had been introduced in Britain’s 
colonial territories from 1825 and constituted the primary medium of exchange in the 
overseas trade of British West Africa despite not being backed by gold.60 Figure 1 
shows imports of British token silver coin into West Africa through the late nine-
teenth century.  In 1906, Wallis reported that while Liberian dollars and cents were 
the ‘official coinage of the Republic’ there was ‘greater demand for pounds, shillings 
and pence, which is legal tender anywhere among the Americo-Liberian settle-
ments’.61 
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Fig. 1 Imports of British Silver Coin into West Africa 
Source: Report of the Departmental Committee Appointed to Inquiry into Matters Af-
fecting the Currency of the British West African Colonies, p. 6.  
 
As Wallis was writing, the Liberian government’s return to the capital market 
had meant that the Liberian state had begun collecting its revenues in sterling. Libe-
ria’s default on the 1871 loan had left the government dependent on domestic borrow-
ing – largely in the form of cash advances from merchants at interest rates on the or-
der of 25 to 30 per cent.62 In 1899, after more than two decades in default, the Liberi-
an government had negotiated a new agreement with its creditors from 1871, reducing 
the interest rate to 3 per cent for three years, rising ½ per cent every three years to a 
maximum of 5 per cent.63 This allowed the Liberian government to raise another loan 
of £100,000 at six per cent interest.  Like the 1871 loan, the purpose of the 1906 loan 
was to repay domestic debt, stabilize Liberia’s financial position, and fund an expan-
sion of public works.64  British officials were placed in charge of customs collections 
as security for a second loan raised in 1906, also denominated in sterling.65 Wallis 
noted a substantial increase in customs collections following the requirement that col-
lections be made in gold, and further observed that ‘previous returns showed the value 
principally in paper currency as against gold under the new arrangement’.66  
Like the 1871 loan, however, the 1906 loan failed to deliver on its promised 
purposes. The loan had been arranged by the Liberian Development Company (LDC) 
and British explorer and former colonial administrator Harry Johnston. The LDC took 
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63 For full text of renegotiated agreement, see Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, Annual Report 
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on the balance of the loan after domestic creditors had been repaid, and in return ap-
pointed two British administrators to manage customs collection and pledged invest-
ments in road-building. The LDC was to retain a share of customs revenue and the 
profits from road-building in repayment of the loan. Unsatisfied with the LDC’s pro-
gress in roadbuilding – only 15 miles of road had been constructed – the Liberian 
government took over the loan in 1908.67  
Liberia’s fiscal and economic problems continued following the collapse of 
the 1906 arrangement. Without resources to invest in infrastructure, Liberia’s trade 
had not expanded at the same rate as that of its neighbours in the early twentieth cen-
tury. For example, in the 1880s per capita exports in both Liberia and Sierra Leone 
were around £0.17, but by 1913 Liberia’s per capita exports had experienced only a 
marginal increase (to £0.25), while Sierra Leone’s had increased to  £0.79 following 
the construction of the railway.68 In search of assistance from sources outside Britain, 
the Liberian government sent a commission to the United States. It arrived in Wash-
ington DC in 1909, at the height of enthusiasm for ‘dollar diplomacy’ in the U.S.  
During the trip the Liberian commission was told about the great success of the ‘fiscal 
protectorate’ established in the Dominican Republic in 1905, in which private financi-
ers refinanced the Republic’s debt, in exchange for which U.S. officials were placed 
in charge of customs collection and a share of customs revenue was devoted to the 
debt service.69   A return commission was appointed by the U.S. government in 1909 
to investigate Liberia’s finances.70 In 1910 the commission’s report noted that in addi-
tion to its foreign debt of just over $900,000 (£187,500), Liberia had accumulated 
                                               
67 Brown, Economic History of Liberia, p. 164.   
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domestic debt of $352,205 (£73,376), only a little less than a year’s revenue.71 It rec-
ommended a controlled loan based on the Dominican model be made to Liberia.72 The 
recommendation of the commission was largely put into place in a loan of $1,700,000 
issued in 1912, known as the refunding loan. Both the British and French govern-
ments protested at the prospect of losing influence in West Africa, so the loan was 
raised internationally but managed by the National City Bank of New York. The in-
ternational character of the 1912 loan was similar to a loan proposed for China.73 Un-
like the previous two loans, the 1912 loan was denominated in U.S. dollars.  
As a condition of the loan, a Customs Receivership comprised of representa-
tives from the UK, France and Germany under the leadership of a Receiver of Cus-
toms appointed by the U.S. government were placed in charge of collecting and man-
aging revenue earmarked for loan service payments, referred to as the assigned reve-
nue. This included customs revenue (which remained the most important source of tax 
revenue), revenue from rubber export tax, and hut tax revenue.74 Revenue from other 
sources remained under the control of the Liberian government.75 As soon as it was 
established, the Receivership issued a circular stating that ‘all customs dues upon im-
ports and exports are payable solely in current gold, and no document or evidence of 
indebtedness of any kind whatsoever will be received in lieu thereof’.76 In practice, 
the medium of payment was principally British coin.77 In 1919 it was reported to the 
Foreign Office that ‘although the Budget of the Republic is framed in Dollars the cur-
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rency in use is almost entirely British Gold and Silver Coin, which has displaced Li-
berian coin, the minting of which ceased some years ago’.78  
At the same time, the entry of the Bank of British West Africa (BBWA) into 
Liberia brought it into an effective currency union with the British West African terri-
tories surrounding it. The BBWA had originated as a department of the Elder Demp-
ster shipping company and had taken over the business of the African Banking Corpo-
ration. Like other British banks operating in the Empire, it found opportunities in 
providing banking services to colonial governments. It became the government bank-
er to the four British colonial administrations in West Africa and from 1894 enjoyed 
the sole right to import British token silver coin into West Africa from the Royal Mint 
free of charges for packing, freight and insurance.79 It also expanded into a number of 
non-British and sovereign territories in Africa, including Morocco and German Togo, 
as well as Liberia. The BBWA’s first extension into Liberia was in 1905, when it 
hired W.D. Woodin & Co. as its agents at Monrovia. Five years later, the bank opened 
its first Liberian branch in Monrovia. 80  After the establishment of the West African 
Currency Board in 1912, the Bank acted as its agent in British territories in West Af-
rica. Agency agreements were signed with trading companies, such as the Oost Afri-
kaansche Compagnie in Grand Bassa (a major port) for operations outside the capital 
city, Monrovia.81  
By 1916 the BBWA had been appointed the state bank of Liberia.82 It was not 
unprecedented for a British bank to act as a state bank for a sovereign state – similar 
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arrangements were in place in China and Iran.83 From 1918 all government salaries 
were paid through the bank in an effort to reduce losses of public money through 
theft.84 The 1916 agreement stated that while the Bank would accept Liberian silver 
and copper coin as part of Government revenues, the government would be required 
to ‘take back the whole or any portion desired by the bank when drawing from its ac-
count’.85 The BBWA was reluctant to accumulate balances of Liberian currency.  By 
the outbreak of World War I there were few uses for Liberian currency, which could 
not be used for the payment of customs tariffs or other assigned revenues.  
The refunding loan allowed Liberia to repay its earlier debts, but financial 
mismanagement continued to create fiscal difficulties.86 The situation worsened con-
siderably with the outbreak of World War I. When Liberia joined the allied cause and 
severed its relations with Germany, which had been a major trading partner, its fi-
nances suffered greatly.87 Assigned revenues decreased from $486,639 (£100,000) in 
1913 to $185,715 (£39,000) in 1916.88 In 1915 an official with the American legation 
in Monrovia noted that ‘the Government is undoubtedly very hard pressed.  How far it 
can drag along, in its present manner of going, drawing behind it a burden that in-
creases rapidly as the weeks go by, is an indeterminate question’.89 By May 1916 the 
Liberian government had given notice to the National City Bank of New York that it 
proposed to suspend payments on the interest and sinking fund for the 1912 loan.90 
The BBWA was asked to lend the Liberian government $9,000 on the first day of 
each month.  All government revenue was to be collected by the Bank in repayment, 
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but given the depressed state of Liberia’s revenue the Bank anticipated a monthly def-
icit of $5,000.91 The Bank, anxious about the potentially unlimited liability which 
could be generated by this arrangement, asked the British government to guarantee 
the loan.  When the British government refused, a cap of $100,000 (or £20,000) was 
imposed on the debt.92 The BBWA was not the only British bank to engage in such 
lending – in Greece, the government looked to the Ionian bank to ‘assist the perenni-
ally chaotic state of Greece’s finances’.93 By 1918, it was reported to the British For-
eign Office that in addition to its external liabilities of $1,458,000 (£300,000), Liberia 
had accumulated internal debts of nearly $400,000 (£83,000), part of which had been 
accrued through the partial (50 per cent) payment of government salaries.94 
 Liberia fit many of the characteristics which are today thought likely to lead to 
dollarization.95 The Liberian dollar’s history of depreciation relative to gold standard 
currencies combined with dependence on British imports provided actors – including 
not only the Americo-Liberian elite but also indigenous Liberians - with a strong in-
centive to deal in sterling rather than local currency.  The state had similar incentives, 
mandating the payment of taxes in sterling so that it could service its debts, denomi-
nated in foreign currency.  The next section will examine the costs and benefits to Li-
beria of adopting sterling, focusing particularly on the changes which led to its even-
tual adoption of the U.S dollar in 1943.  
 
III 
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It is difficult to measure the benefit to Liberia relative to the costs of losing its mone-
tary sovereignty.  In their study of Mexico in the late twentieth century, Cooley and 
Quadrini conclude that ‘the cost of losing the ability to react to shocks is much small-
er than the potential losses or gains deriving from the reduction of the long-term infla-
tion’.96 The Liberian Treasury’s difficulties in managing its currency suggests that the 
same would be true there. However, ‘dollarization’ also came with costs.  
 The first was that Liberia’s supply of circulating currency depended on the 
continued export of silver coin to West Africa, and it had no control over changes 
made in Britain to the monetary arrangements of British West Africa.  By 1910, the 
scale of such exports had become a matter of some concern for the British govern-
ment.  While it was the dominant circulating medium in West Africa, silver coin was 
a token currency in Britain, and not backed by gold.  Its value was managed by a care-
ful judgement of supply and demand, which could be undermined if an economic cri-
sis in West Africa led to substantial quantities of British silver flowing back to Brit-
ain.97 To avoid this possibility, a separate West African currency was introduced in 
1912, managed by the newly established West African Currency Board (WACB).  
The WACB was allowed to repatriate substantial quantities of British coinage, as it 
increased the quantity of West African issues.  Figure 2 shows the quantity of repatri-
ated token silver alongside WACB issues. 
 
Fig. 2 WACB Currency Issues and Repatriated British Silver Coin 
Source: West African Currency Board, Annual Reports.  
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 The introduction of the new WACB currency prompted efforts in Liberia to 
demonetize foreign currency and return to the Liberian dollar.  A bill imposing heavy 
penalties on anyone caught importing foreign currency, and authorising a new issue of 
Liberian coinage, was put before the Liberian legislature and passed in 1914.  The bill 
was originally intended to target only the British West African coinage, but the final 
version included all foreign currency.98  
Objections to British West African currency were two-pronged.  Firstly, there 
was limited confidence in the value of WACB currencies relative to sterling, not only 
in Liberia but amongst trading firms in the region.99  This concern prompted Liberian 
president Daniel Howard (1912-20), to ask the British Consul-General ‘what good a 
pocketful of this new money would be to anybody landing in Liverpool or London’.  
Further, the President was concerned about rumours that banks would only receive 
British West African currency at a substantial discount.  At the President’s request, 
the consul produced a letter from the manager of the BBWA’s Monrovia branch, stat-
ing that the currency could be changed into British sterling in London or Liverpool, 
and that the Bank would receive it at par value.100 Secondly, they perceived a threat to 
Liberian sovereignty in the new currency.  Howard told the manager of the BBWA’s 
Monrovia branch that ‘the people did not want any coins bearing the description 
“British West Africa” in Liberia.  They do not mind the imperial coins so much, but 
they strongly objected to the Colonial coins, and fancy that an attempt is being made 
to gradually “British-ise” Liberia’.101  
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 Ultimately, the bill was suspended under British and American pressure.102 
The objections of the British government were based on the fact that the refusal of 
Liberians to accept the new WACB currency might interfere with its acceptance in 
British West Africa, and that the passage of the bill might hinder British trading inter-
ests in the Republic.103 By the end of the War, WACB coins were accepted in pay-
ment of customs duties, alongside imperial silver.104  
 How far the introduction of WACB currency affected Africans in Liberia’s 
interior (and the extent to which indigenous people they raised any objection) remains 
uncertain. Export industries were slow to develop and surviving records indicate there 
were limits to the degree of monetization, particularly in rural areas. The 1916 agree-
ment with the BBWA also included instructions on how to account for the payment of 
taxes in goods rather than cash.105 However, by 1937 the U.S. Financial adviser to the 
Liberian government reported that WACB coins were used alongside ‘native “iron” 
money’.106 
The level of monetization in the interior began to increase with the establish-
ment of the Firestone Rubber Plantation, which not only employed a large labour 
force of 30,000 by the 1940s, but also encouraged the independent production of rub-
ber by African smallholders.107 Firestone’s expansion into rubber production paral-
leled that of other firms.  The British embargo of rubber exports during World War I 
had prompted American tyre manufacturers to seek alternative supplies of rubber. 
Further impetus was provided by the Stevenson Plan of 1922, which introduced ex-
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port quotas in Malaya and Ceylon.108 The Stevenson plan compounded fears in the 
U.S. following World War I that Britain and other imperial powers would adopt poli-
cies which would restrict U.S. access to raw materials from their colonial territo-
ries.109 Harvey Firestone saw the Stevenson Act as ‘a threat to the industry’s supply of 
rubber’, and took steps to secure alternative supplies.110 In 1925 the Liberian govern-
ment concluded an agreement with Firestone which gave the company a 99-year lease 
on an experimental rubber plantation near Monrovia, a 99-year lease on a million 
acres to be used for rubber production, and the right to improve the harbour facilities 
of Monrovia.111 Rubber rapidly became Liberia’s most important export.  Figure 3 
compares Liberia’s principal exports from 1938 with 1908.  
 
Fig. 3 Principal Exports from Liberia, 1908 and 1938 
Sources: Parks, Report on the Trade and Commerce of Liberia 1909; Report on the 
Financial Operations of the Republic of Liberia 1939, in TNA FO 271/24444.  
 
 The Firestone concession was linked to an agreement with the Finance Corpo-
ration of America, a subsidiary of Firestone for a new loan of U.S. $5,000,000 to be 
managed by the National City Bank of New York.112 After the end of the war, the Li-
berian government had sought a new loan from the U.S. government along the lines of 
the 1912 loan, but the plan was voted down by the U.S. House of Representatives 
amidst new opposition to the dollar diplomacy loans of the pre-war period. The U.S. 
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government therefore looked to private interests to carry on the dollar diplomacy mis-
sion – in Liberia’s case, Firestone.113 
 The Firestone concession was also linked to a major change in Liberia’s bank-
ing sector.  The BBWA, which had functioned as the state bank of Liberia since 1916, 
closed its Liberian branches in September 1930.114 The Bank’s stated reason for clos-
ing was that the limited sanitation facilities in Monrovia presented a danger to the 
bank’s staff.115 However, officials in the British government suspected that the real 
reason was limited profitability.116 The closure of the Liberia branch was one of a 
number of branch closures by the bank during the 1930s – from a pre-war peak of 55 
branches in 1929, the number of branches had decreased to 39 by 1941.117  
A Firestone subsidiary – the United States Trading Company (Banking De-
partment) - stepped into the breach left in the management of state finances. The new 
bank was an ad-hoc arrangement, designed to make sure the Liberian government did 
not have to go without banking services after the departure of the BBWA. The U.S. 
Trading Company already operated in Liberia, selling provisions to Firestone staff.  
Its banking branch was intended to serve primarily as a depository for government 
revenue, in order to safeguard payments servicing the Firestone loan.  Its sole branch 
was in Monrovia, in the same building that had been occupied by the BBWA.118 In 
1935, the USTC (Banking Department) became the Bank of Monrovia, but remained 
a Firestone subsidiary. In his study of the expansion of American banking, Phelps 
notes that one source of such expansion involved commercial firms not actually clas-
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sified as banks which nevertheless provided banking services abroad.119 The Bank of 
Monrovia fit this category until 1955, when it was acquired by the First National City 
Bank of New York, which had opened branches through Latin America and Europe 
following the passage of the Federal Reserve Act of 1914.120 The Bank of Monrovia 
served as the fiscal depository to the Liberian government until the establishment of 
the National Bank of Liberia in 1974.121  
The shift from British to American dominance did not present problems so 
long as the pound-dollar exchange rate remained stable.  When the rate changed, 
however, it raised the cost of servicing Liberia’s debt and exacerbated the country’s 
fiscal difficulties. After World War I, for example, sterling was received in Liberia at 
a rate of $4.80, but remittances to the U.S. in payment of interest on the 1912 refund-
ing loan were received at the London/New York rate of around $4.15.122 The devalua-
tion of the early 1930s (see Figure 4) also made it difficult for Liberia to service its 
debts and affected the purchasing power of Liberians.  The annual message of Presi-
dent Edwin Barclay (1930-44) to the Legislature for 1932 reported that ‘the difference 
in the rate at which we receive sterling for government taxes and other income and the 
rate which the Government is credited when it has to pay its foreign claims represents 
a loss of a little over 26 per cent’.123 Liberian revenues were already suffering owing 
to a falling off of trade during the Depression.  An uprising among the Kru also re-
quired rapid increases in public spending.  In 1932 the budget deficit amounted to 
nearly half of total revenue (Figure 5). A surplus was achieved in 1933, but only be-
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cause the Liberian government suspended payments on the Firestone loan in Decem-
ber 1932.124 
 
Fig. 4 Sterling-dollar exchange rate, 1920-38 (1929=100, annual averages)  
Source: Dimsdale, ‘British monetary policy’, tables 3 and 9.  
 
Fig. 5 Deficit/Surplus as a Percentage of Total Revenue, 1928-38 
Source: Steadman, Report on the Fiscal System of the Republic of Liberia 
 
The outbreak of World War II resulted in further difficulties relating to the de-
valuation of the pound.  In 1939 Firestone commissioned Edwin Kemmerer, Princeton 
economist and ‘money doctor’, to write a plan for monetary reform in Liberia. As in 
the 1930s, the declining dollar value of sterling made it increasingly difficult for the 
Liberian government to satisfy its obligations. The burden of both the salaries of U.S. 
officials and external debt payments was increased by the decline of sterling from 
$4.80 to approximately $4.00.125 This change did not merely affect state finances.  
With the establishment of the Firestone plantation as well as the outbreak of war, Li-
berian trade had become increasingly oriented towards the U.S., at the expense of 
Britain.  Figure 6 below shows the changing pattern of Liberian trade.  The declining 
dollar value of sterling also increased the cost of U.S. imports for the private sector.   
 
Fig. 6 Foreign Trade by Country, 1937-9  
Source: Report on the Financial Operations of the Republic of Liberia for the year 
1939, in TNA FO 371/24444.  
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After the turmoil of the early 1930s there was increasing pressure for Liberia 
to move from British sterling to the U.S. dollar. Local circumstances provide much of 
the explanation for this, but contemporaries also saw it as a symptom of the global 
rise of the dollar at the expense of sterling.126 In December 1942 the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York Press Summary noted that Liberia’s currency change ‘is believed 
to foreshadow the emergence of the dollar as an international currency… Dollar ex-
change is steadily replacing the pound sterling as an international currency ex-
change’.127 
Despite pressure coming from several sources, the implementation of the 
change was slow. In 1935 a law was passed establishing a gold dollar equivalent to 
the U.S. dollar as Liberia’s monetary unit, and empowering the Treasury to demone-
tize British silver.128 In practice, the law did not take effect until eight years later, 
when sterling was replaced by the dollar in 1943, and shipments of British sterling 
were made as late as 1942, when £20,000 in British silver coin was shipped to Mon-
rovia.129  The next section will examine the challenges of changing currency in a dol-
larized economy.   
 
IV 
 
Dollarization is effective in limiting expectations of inflation precisely because it is 
difficult to reverse.  Eichengreen describes dollarization as ‘not just locking the door 
to the central bank (the currency board solution) but effectively throwing away the 
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30 
 
key’.130 The transitional costs of switching from one currency to another are one rea-
son for the additional credibility of dollarization as compared with a fixed exchange 
rate.131 In Liberia’s case, the cost of physically replacing the circulating currency was 
a major obstacle to moving from sterling to the U.S. dollar.  According to U.S. offi-
cials in Liberia, these costs were estimated to be $100,000-$150,000, ‘which Liberia 
does not have available for this purpose’.132 Further, the cooperation of the British 
Treasury was needed to dispose of large quantities of token silver coin, as it was only 
legal tender up to £2.  
 In the end, the needs of the war effort prevailed over both obstacles. From 
1942 an extensive U.S. military establishment was based in Liberia to protect rubber 
supplies.133 A letter sent from the State Department in Washington D.C. to the U.S. 
legation in Liberia noted that ‘the appearance of American forces in Liberia will im-
mediately present an important commissary and paymaster problem.  The War De-
partment has expressed a desire to introduce, if possible, American currency for local 
expenditures and salary payments’.134 This was the option preferred by the Bank of 
Monrovia, which was trying to limit its exchange risk.135 
 In addition to the costs of physically exchanging one currency for another, 
such a currency change has considerable information costs. Goodhart argues that ‘in 
many historical, and current, examples of currency-area dissolution, separation has 
occurred when some event has already diminished the information value of the shared 
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currency within the separating region or state’.136 The information costs of the change 
would have been mitigated by the fluctuations in the pound-dollar exchange rate, 
which had complicated past efforts to plan future expenditure.  A League of Nations 
report from 1932 noted that ‘it was clear that in view of the changing currencies and 
the varying economic conditions it was impossible to fix a budget here and now.’137 
The devaluation of the late 1930s is likely to have produced similar confusion. How-
ever, many private contracts were denominated in sterling.  The League of Nations 
recorded a range of pawnship contracts, in which people were used as collateral for 
debt, the vast majority of which were denominated in sterling.  For example, one 
Jadgua, a headman from Kanga, living near Royesville, fined £18 0s 2d for road de-
linquencies, pawned his wife and child for £7 to one Kankawah.138 This suggests that 
not only credit contracts but also state fines were denominated in sterling, and would 
need to be changed on the switch to the dollar.  
 After negotiations with the British government, token silver coin and WACB 
coinage were collected in Liberia and shipped to the West Indies (where there was a 
shortage of British currency) and Sierra Leone, respectively.139 A public notice of 7 
December 1942 by the President Barclay announced that it was ‘the intention of the 
Government to withdraw British coins and to adopt U.S currency as a circulating me-
dium’. British coins would be redeemed in U.S. dollars at the rate of $4.00 to the 
pound.  They could also be used to pay ‘taxes and other public obligations’ up to 30 
June 1943.140  
The question of Liberia’s monetary independence continued to be discussed in 
subsequent decades. While some viewed the use of the U.S. dollar as necessary to at-
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tract investment under the open door policies pursued after the war, others saw it as 
unnecessarily exposing Liberia to volatility in the global economy and subjecting it to 
weaknesses in U.S. monetary policy.141 Dollarization has proved difficult to reverse. 
An effort to re-introduce higher denomination Liberian currency in the form of $5 
coins by the government of Samuel Doe following the 1980 coup initially drove U.S 
dollar notes out of circulation, as people hoarded the higher-value currency. ‘Doe dol-
lars’ were initially issued at par with the U.S. dollars, but were eventually deflated to 
half or less of their original value.142 Even after the establishment of the Central Bank 
of Liberia in 1999, the the ratio of foreign currency deposits to local currency deposits 
has remained high.143 The Central Bank of Liberia, which was established in 1999, 
reported that 73.5 per cent of broad money (M2) was comprised of US$ in the first 
quarter of 2013, indicating ‘the highly dollarized nature of the economy’.144  
 
V 
 
 Liberia’s adoption of a super-fixed regime in the early twentieth century sug-
gests that the story of African monetary history during the gold standard era is more 
complicated than one of colonial conquest. Super-fixed regimes served the interests 
not only of imperial powers but also of African elites who relied on access to global 
markets for both goods and capital to sustain their rule.145 In Liberia’s case, both for-
eign trade and foreign borrowing were essential to the maintenance of the Americo-
Liberian settler state, and both were facilitated by the system of de facto dollarization 
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142 Liebenow, Liberia, p. 307.  
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adopted from 1906. As Bordo and Flandreau’s analysis suggests, parallels with sover-
eign countries in Asia and Latin America are easy to find.  Meeting the costs of mili-
tary expansion were central to Japan’s adoption of the gold standard, for example.146   
The inclusion of Liberia in the debate about colonial currency regimes raises a 
number of questions. The first is the extent to which different interest groups gained 
or lost from the exchange rate regime in place at the time. The continuing restrictions 
on the actions of African central banks after independence suggests that, as in Liberia, 
key constituencies in many former British colonies also gained from the monetary 
stability offered by the currency board system. In a context in which multiple curren-
cies often circulate, such an approach also implies investigating why actors choose 
one currency over another.147 
 The second is whether monetary independence in colonial Africa would, in 
fact, have benefitted colonial economies.148  The structural factors which undermined 
the Liberian dollar were also present elsewhere. Budget crises were common in Afri-
can colonies which, like Liberia, were vulnerable to changes in external demand for 
their exports.149 It seems likely that other African territories would have also suc-
cumbed to the temptation to print money in order to fund either emergency expendi-
ture or development efforts, if they had not been limited by a super-fixed regime.  The 
fear that colonial administrations would do just that was one of the key motivations 
for the establishment of currency boards in British colonial Africa.150  
Liberia has often complicated assessments of the costs and benefits of coloni-
alism in Africa. In a widely-publicized interview in 1957, Charles King, the Liberian 
representative to the United Nations, argued that colonialism explained why Ghana 
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was more developed than Liberia. He described the difference between Liberia and 
Ghana as ‘the difference between the home of a man who has had to accomplish eve-
rything by his own sweat and toil and that of a man who has enjoyed a large inher-
itance’.151 Just a few years later, Northwestern economist George Dalton wrote ‘for 
those who are impressed by the favourite myth of African political leaders  - that be-
fore European colonization Africa must have enjoyed some sort of golden age, be-
cause its present economic and social problems are the evil legacy of wicked Europe-
an colonialism – an examination of Liberia is instructive’.152  While the case for Libe-
ria as a counter-factual to colonialism cannot be taken too far, owing to the limited 
legitimacy of the Americo-Liberian state, it can perhaps yield some insights. Liebe-
now draws a comparison between Americo-Liberians and the Zulu, or the Amharic-
speaking peoples of Ethiopia.153 In Ethiopia, the process of state consolidation, which 
took place during the nineteenth century, also involved pressure from both external 
and internal rivals, and the expansion of power was linked to international trade. Like 
Liberia, Ethiopia also used a foreign currency (the Maria Theresa dollar) despite hav-
ing a history of coin production dating to the third century.154 Indigenous African 
states may have faced similar fiscal challenges with respect to maintaining their sov-
ereignty, and therefore the same choices with regard to their monetary and economic 
policy.  
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Fig. 1 Imports of British token silver coin into West Africa  
 
Source: Report of the Departmental Committee Appointed to Inquiry into Matters Af-
fecting the Currency of the British West African Colonies, p. 6.  
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Fig. 2 WACB Currency Issues and Repatriated British Silver Coin 
 
Source: West African Currency Board, Annual Reports.  
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Fig. 3 Principal Exports from Liberia, 1908 and 1938  
 
Parks, Report on the Trade and Commerce of Liberia 1909; Report on the Financial 
Operations of the Republic of Liberia for the year 1939, in TNA FO 371/24444.  
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Fig. 4 Pound-dollar exchange rate, 1920-38  
 
Source: Dimsdale, ‘British monetary policy’, tables 3 and 9.  
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Fig. 5 Deficit/Surplus as a Percentage of Total Revenue, 1928-38 
 
Source: Steadman, Report on the Fiscal System of the Republic of Liberia.  
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Fig. 6 Foreign Trade by Country, 1937-9 
a. Exports 
 
b. Imports 
 
Source: Report on the Financial Operations of the Republic of Liberia for the year 
1939, in TNA FO 371/24444.  
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